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Abstract
The social science literature has done much to document pervasive
racial discrimination in Brazil and there is little doubt that a very dark
color is a handicap to social advancement. Nevertheless, very few em-
pirical economic studies have attempted to quantify the impact of ethnic
discrimination in Brazil. Using data culled from the Pesquisa National
por Amostra de Domic￿lios (PNAD), this paper ￿lls this void by analysing
ethnic wage and employment gaps, as well as occupational segregation in
Brazil, using the Oaxaca decomposition methodology.
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1 Introduction
Many people in Brazil associate racial discrimination with the hatred of spe-
ci￿c ethnic groups. They also virulently reject any possibility of racial di⁄erence
because of the widespread belief that Brazilian social relationships are both har-
monious and based on principles of equality. In addition, the concept of "racial
democracy", as initially developed by the anthropologist G. Freyre (1933), em-
phasizes the importance of miscegenation as a fundamental characteristic of
Brazilian society, and is widely adhered too.1 Moreover, the ￿ uidity of the color
1G. Freyre developed this concept while the theory of ￿scienti￿c￿ racism based on the
biological superiority of whites was very present in all minds. He originally wished to re-
spond to O. Venna concerning the advantage of mixture among the Portuguese, Aboriginal
and African ethnic groups (see Skidmore, 1992). Before G. Freyre, several Brazilian scholars
presented miscegnation as being the salvation of Brazil through its ￿whitening￿of the popula-
tion. The object of these theories was to reconcile the multi-racial aspect of Brazilian society
with the concept of white superiority. In the period following Freyre￿ s work, some authors,
for example Pierson (1942), T. de Azevedo (1952) or the group of scholars known as the "Sªo
Paulo School", led by F. Fernandes and F.H. Cardoso, concluded that class inequality is far
more important than racial inequality.
1line in Brazil, to whit the tendency of a person to declare themselves ￿brown￿
one day and ￿white￿ later on if their relative position on the social ladder has
improved, was seen as a serious impediment to the study of racial inequalities.
It was not until the end of the military dictatorship in 1986 that the ￿rst sta-
tistical studies dealing with racial inequalities appeared, since, in the name of
national unity, the dictatorship vigorously upheld the concept of racial democ-
racy. To that end, the department of sociology of the University of Sªo Paulo
was closed and racial issues were dropped from the 1970 national census. This
e⁄ectively prevented all empirical research on racial issues. It was not until
the 1976 national household survey (PNAD) that data by racial group became
available once more.
The studies that ￿ owed in the wake of the 1976 PNAD, all carried out by
demographers and sociologists, highlighted the hurdles faced by Afrobrazilians
in terms of their attempts to improve their relative position in the labour mar-
ket. Many Brazilians believe, consciously or otherwise, in a hierarchy of human
groups.2 This has led some observers to propose a¢ rmative action programs
geared towards breaking the discrimination inherited from the past.
The successful implementation of such policies is dependent upon identifying
the relative importance of three types of discrimination that potentially plague
the Brazilian labour market: (i) employment discrimination, (ii) wage discrim-
ination, and (iii) occupational segregation. Economists have contributed little
to this debate and to the best of our knowledge this paper constitutes the ￿rst
study that applies the classic Oaxaca (1973, 1994) methodology to these three
problems simultaneously. In contrast to the US literature, we will treat the
black and brown ethnic groups separately, in order to allow for Degler￿ s (1971)
celebrated concept of the ￿mulatto escape hatch￿ : browns are widely held to
occupy a more priviledged position than are blacks.3
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we outline the methodology
used to decompose the ethnic wage and employment gaps. We also show how to
identify the magnitude of occupational segregation in determining inter-ethnic
wages di⁄erences while solving the index number problem. Section 3 presents
the empirical results, while section 4 summarizes and concludes.
2 Decomposition methodology
The Oaxaca methodology (1973, 1994) was initially developed so as to decom-
pose the earnings gap among groups into a ￿rst component that depends upon
2This study is limited to quantifying the importance of discrimination on the Brazilian
labor market. The reasons that lie behind discrimination are not examined. Nogueira (1985),
Skidmore (1974, 1992) and others have stated that, in Brazil, a person with a darker skin is
perceived with a negative a priori. This form of discrimination would appear to square with
the concept of statitiscal discrimination developed by Phelps (1972) and Aigner and Cain
(1977) and, which results from imperfect information on the labor market.
3Nevertheless, it is contrary to the results obtained by N. V. Silva (1985, 1988) who shows
that blacks and browns do not behave di⁄erently. In addition, Lovell (1991) ￿nds that blacks
su⁄er more discrimination than do browns.
2individual characteristics that a⁄ect productivity and another component as-
sociated with discrimination. This approach has been extended to allow one
(i) to identify inter-occupational and intra-occupational wage di⁄erences among
groups (Brown et al (1980), Neuman and Silber (1996), Appleton et al (1999))
and (ii) to explain di⁄erences in employment rates (Blackaby et al (1994, 1998)
or Altonji and Blank (1999)). The employment rate gap on the labour market






























where Pi is the predicted employment probability for ethnic group i, ’(:) is the
average predicted unemployment probability, Xi is the vector of endowments,
b ￿i is the vector of estimated coe¢ cients from the unemployment probit equa-
tion and ￿
￿is the vector of competitive coe¢ cients which would obtain in the
absence of discrimination. In his early work (on wage decompositions), Oaxaca
(1973) proposed using the coe¢ cient vector b ￿w or b ￿b as the non-discriminatory
norm. However, Neumark (1988) argued that the appropriate decomposition
should depend on the type of discrimination: on the one hand, employers may
engage in nepotism that favors ethnic group i; on the other hand, they may
practice discrimination against ethnic group j. In the ￿rst case, the employ-
ment rate of ethnic group j would constitute the non-discriminatory norm while
in the second case it would be the employment rate of group i. Eventually,
Neumark (1988) and Oaxaca and Ransom (1994) proposed using, as the non-
discriminatory norm, the vector of coe¢ cients ￿
￿ that is obtained by estimat-
ing the unemployment probit equation on data which pools all ethnic groups.4
More precisely, ￿




the Oaxaca-Ransom weighting matrix.5
The ￿rst term in equation (1) represents the portion of the earnings gap due
to di⁄erences in individual characteristics while the second term is associated
with di⁄erences in coe¢ cients and is attributed to discrimination. The discrimi-
nation term is decomposed into two components: the advantage of ethnic group
w and the disavantage of ethnic group b relative to a non-discriminatory norm.6
4See Neumark (1988) for the assumptions that underlie the theoretical model. Initially,
the discussion was about the competitive wage structure in the case of an earnings equation.
5See Reimers (1983) or Cotton (1988) for alternative weighting matrices.
6Note however that the discrimination component may in fact be partly the result of
omitted variables, mispeci￿cation or measurement error. In particular, endogeneity bias may
lead to a downwardly or upwardly biased estimate of the racial gap if the correlation of the
explanatory variables with omitted variables is speci￿c to ethnic group. See Kim and Polachek
3In addition, as in Brown et al (1980), Neuman and Silber (1996) and more
recently as in Appleton et al (1999), we identify the earnings gap ￿Y due to
human capital di⁄erences, wage discrimination and occupational segregation in


















































￿y due to occupational segregation
]
where p￿
c is the probability of being in sector c in the absence of segregation, pi
c
is the proportion of ethnic group i that belongs to occupational group c, Z
i
c is
the vector of average endowments of the members of ethnic group i, b ￿
i
c is the
vector of estimated coe¢ cients from the traditional Mincerian wage equation,
and b ￿
￿
c is the vector of competitive coe¢ cients.8 Silber (1992) shows that, in
the absence of segregation ￿ which corresponds to a Duncan dissimilarity index
of zero ￿ the share of ethnic group i in occupation c should be equal to this
occupation￿ s share of the labour market.9 As stated by Neuman and Silber
(1996), this means that one assumes that the reallocation of workers between
occupations does not a⁄ect the occupational wage structure. Technically, the
implication is that p￿











c is the number of individuals of ethnic group i working in sector c and
Ni is the number of individuals of ethnic group i in the labour market. Another
approach, proposed by Brown et al (1980) and Miller (1987), assumes that one
of the two groups does not su⁄er from occupational segregation, although this
implies that their estimates su⁄er from an index number problem. These au-
thors do, however, go further, in that they decompose the segregation e⁄ect
into two components, the ￿rst stemming from di⁄erences in endowments and
the second corresponding to a ￿pure￿segregation e⁄ect. In order to do so and
(1994) for the impact of these biases on the decomposition of racial gaps.
7Note that this decomposition implies that the wage gap is the same along the whole of
the wage scale. See Jenkins (1994) or Mwabu and Schultz (1996) for methods that relax this
assumption such as the distributional or the quantile regression approaches.
8This vector of competitive coe¢ cients is obtained by estimating a wage equation on data
which pools all ethnic groups.








4simultaneously solve the index number problem, one must estimate the coe¢ -
cients associated with occupational choice that one would obtain in the absence
of segregation. Using equation (2), we are able to implement this approach
using Silber￿ s result on p￿
c and, as mentioned by Neuman and Silber (1996), by
noting that
(3) p￿





where Wc are the population averages of the explanatory variables that a⁄ect
occupational choice and ^ ￿c is the vector of coe¢ cients obtained by estimating a
multinominal logit model of occupational choice on pooled data.10 We can then
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c is the average predicted probability of an individual from ethnic group
i with attributes Z
i
c of being in sector c if he faced the non-discriminatory
sectoral distribution b ￿
￿
c. The ￿rst term on the right-hand-side represents the
￿pure￿e⁄ect of segregation, while the second term is that part of the wage gap
due to di⁄erences in employment attributes. This decomposition allows one to
take sectoral di⁄erences in earnings into account.
3 Results
The data set is derived from the 1998 national household survey (PNAD) col-
lected by the Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE).11 The sample, com-
posed of males of between 25 and 65 years of age, covers 69,956 individuals of
whom 52.78% are white, 41.11% brown, and 6.11% black.12
10See Appleton et al (1999) who solve the index number problem in the same manner.
11The data are available on their web site at http://www.ibge.gov.br
12The de￿nition of an ethnic group in Brazil is fraught with di¢ culties. In particular, there
is a bewilderingly large number of terms that are used to refer to a person￿ s ethnic origin or
skin color. Lovell (1999), who provides a useful summary of the current state of the literature,
notes that a study by Valle Silva (1996) ￿nds that only 57 percent of individuals faced with an
open question in terms of their color classify themselves into one of the three groups refered
to here. On the other hand, when faced with a closed question expressed in terms of the
three above-mentioned groups, all individuals are able and (more or less) willing to classify
themselves. ￿Yellows￿ were excluded from our sample as they did not constitute a group of
su¢ cient magnitude.
5Table 2 in the Appendix reports descriptive statistics for the three ethnic
groups broken down into employed and unemployed individuals. The employ-
ment rate is de￿ned as the percentage of individuals of age between 25 and 65
years who were employed during the interview week.13 The rate of predicted em-
ployment, which di⁄ers signi￿canly by ethnic group, is equal to 88.92%, 84.98%
and 82.51% respectively for whites, browns and blacks.14
Figure 1 presents the cumulative density function of the logarithm of hourly
wage-earnings, by ethnic group. As should be obvious from Figure 1, there
is a clear shift to the right of the respective cumulative densities (as in ￿rst
order stochastic dominance) as one moves from Afro-Brazilians to the white
ethnic group. However, there is no clear di⁄erence between browns and blacks.
This same tendency emerges in Table 2. The hourly wage of blacks are on
average half of those of whites, whereas browns appear to do as well as browns.
Moreover, Afrobrazilians work mainly in the agricultural and industrial sectors
where the average number of years of schooling is smaller. Di⁄erences in earnings
and employment attributes may partly explain the ethnic-speci￿c nature of the
employment rates, earnings and occupational distributions. Browns and blacks
are largely penalized in terms of human capital (educational attainment, labour
market experience and health) with respect to whites, and this is true whether
they are employed or not. Moreover, the concentration of blacks and browns
is higher in the poorer regions of Brazil (North and Northeast), a geographic
concentration that stems from three centuries of slavery. Lastly, Afrobrazilians
are more concentrated in rural areas, which should also penalize them in termS
of employment opportunities.
Table 1 displays the employment and earnings decomposition results. The
￿rst part of Table 1 displays the employment decomposition results. Employ-
ment probit equations were estimated both on pooled data and for each ethnic
group in order to estimate b ￿
￿
and b ￿i. We considered attributes of employment
such as age, age squared, years of schooling, self-evaluation of health, family
status, region of residence, location (urban or rural), presence of a young child,
and household income per capita (excluding own earnings).15
The results presented in Table 1 highlight that the employment gap be-
tween browns and whites is to a great extent due to di⁄erences in endowments
(82.98%). This means (in the absence of pre-entry discrimination on the labour
market) that the shortfall in the rate of employment faced by browns is mainly
the outcome of social inequalities inherited from the past, rather than discrimi-
nation.16 In other words, it suggests that for browns, racial inequality could be
13We consider the unemployment rate as the percentage of individuals aged between 25 and
65 who were unemployed during the interview week. We are conscious of the fact that we
should have only considered individuals who are both unemployed and actively looking for
employment. However, many individuals in Brazil do not have the opportunity to actively
search for a job because of the extremely di¢ cult social conditions in their neighbourhoods.
14Note that the probit model implies that the predicted employment probability is slightly
di⁄erent from the actual employment proportion.
15See Table 4 of the Appendix for the estimates that underlie these results.
16Using a linear probability model does not change these results.
6Table 1: Decomposition of Ethnic Employment and Earnings Di⁄erences
Components Browns Black
Employment Decomposition
Mean total predicted di⁄erencial 0:0394 0:0641
Pw￿Pb (100%) (100%)
Di⁄erences in endowments 0:0327 0:0142 h
’(b ￿
￿





Employment discrimination 0:0067 0:0302 h












Mean total di⁄erential adjusted for self-selection 0:7235 0:7493 ￿
Y w￿Y b￿(^ ￿w￿ ￿w￿^ ￿b￿ ￿b)
￿
(100%) (100%)








































































Source: Pesquisa National por Amostra de Domic￿lios, 1998.
Note: In the case of the earnings decomposition, we grouped di⁄erent sectors into the seven
main sectors (see the Appendix).
a purely transitory phenomenon. In contrast, for blacks, the shortfall in the rate
of employment is explained by the two e⁄ects (endowment and discrimination)
which are of roughly equivalent magnitude.
The second part of Table 1 displays the earnings decomposition results. We
decomposed the ethnic wage gap while adjusting for self-selection into employ-
ment (Heckman, 1976, 1979).17 The attributes assumed to a⁄ect the loga-
rithm of hourly wages considered were: experience on the labour market (age
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where ￿ ￿i is the average inverse Mill ratio controling for selectivity into employment and ^ ￿i
represents the coe¢ cients estimated from the earnings equations (see Oaxaca and Neuman
(2001) for alternatives and more detailed decompositions). We then analyse the adjusted wage
di⁄erentials and not the observed wage di⁄erentials. Household income per capita (excluding
own income) was used as the idenfying variable. Note that the standard approach to correcting
for selectivity bias assumes that the errors are normally distributed. See Schafgans (2002) for
a semi-parametric approach that relaxes this assumption. Finally, there is potentially another
source of selectivity bias due to the endogeneity of sectoral employment choice (see Appleton
et al (1999)).
7minus years of schooling minus 6), experience squared, years of schooling, self-
evaluation of health, family status, region of residence, location (urban or rural),
presence of a young child and signature of a formal labour contract. Earnings
functions were estimated for each ethnic group and each occupation.18 Doing
so allowed us to apply the classical decomposition procedure to each sector.
In addition, a multinominal logit speci￿cation was estimated for each ethnic
group in order to determine b ￿
￿
c and ^ pi￿
c . We considered the following seven agre-
gated sectors : Professional and Technical, Services, Administration, Trades,
Transportation, Industry and Agriculture.19 In Table 5 of the Appendix, we
present the actual distribution of each ethnic group, as well as the distribution
that would prevail if their speci￿c attributes were rewarded as if there were no
discrimination. Finally, the last row displays the sectoral distribution in the
absence of segregation.
The shortfall in wages su⁄ered by the brown and black ethnic groups can be
explained by three e⁄ects of di⁄erent magnitude. First, lower levels of endow-
ments explain more than half of inter-ethnic di⁄erences in wages. This e⁄ect
should vanish with time, in particular if there is no discrimination in terms
of access to educational opportunities. Second, ￿pure￿discrimination, respec-
tively for browns and blacks, accounts for 23 and 35 percent of the shortfall. It
is interesting to note that the wage gap is slightly larger for browns, but that
the discrimination component (in percentage terms) is greater for blacks. This
corresponds to the same pattern as with the employment decomposition. While
a¢ rmative action programs may reduce labour market discrimination, available
evidence for Brazil suggests that prejudice lies at its heart: as such, a¢ rma-
tive action programs may exacerbate this form of prejudice by suggesting that
success is not wholly based on merit. Moreover, prejudice-based discrimination
can be eliminated by permanent programs, which run counter to the princi-
ples upon which such initiatives are formulated in Brazil. Programs aimed at
hightening awareness concerning the value of ethnic diversity might constitute
a more promising approach. However, our results have to be interpreted with
caution. This is because we are unable to isolate the component which is due
to inequality of opportunity before entry into the labour market. In particular,
the Brazilian educational system is characterized by the coexistence at all levels
of private and public institutions that di⁄er greatly in quality. Only wealthier
students (i.e., whites) can a⁄ord private schools which display higher returns
to schooling.20 A portion of what we attribute to discrimination on the labour
market may thus be due to the impact of di⁄erences in educational quality on
18See Tables 6, 7, 8 of the Appendix. All the estimates present a familiar pattern, that is
to say, hourly earnings increase along with the human capital variables (years of completed
schooling, health dummy). There are also important variations by region.
19If the sectors were ordered according to the type of quali￿cation required we would have
been able to estimate an ordered probit, as suggested by numerous authors. However, as
stated by Meng and Miller (1995), the estimates provided by the ordered probit and those
provided by the multinominal logit are quite similar.
20See Herran and Rodriguez (2000) for a complete discussion concerning heterogeneity in
the quality education in Brazil.
8the returns to schooling stemming from whether students attended private or
public schools. In other words, we are unable to isolate that portion of discrim-
ination due to inequality of opportunity that ￿ ows from di⁄erences in family
background.21
Finally, the most striking result is that the impact of occupational segre-
gation is negligible. Therefore, programs aimed at facilitating the access of
Afro-Brazilians to sectors where they are underrepresented do not appear as a
legitimate course of action in the Brazilian case. This is either because existing
programs have done their job or because there was (and remains) no occupa-
tional discrimination to speak of.
4 Concluding Remarks
This paper has investigated ethnic wage and employment gaps. We have found
that discrimination in the Brazilian labour market is present, particularly with
respect to wages. Nevertheless, this does not mean that discrimination is absent
in employment insofar as unemployment duration may vary by ethnic group. We
have also highlighted that there are no great di⁄erences in the employment and
wage gaps su⁄ered by blacks versus those a⁄ecting browns. In contrast, the
portion of the gaps due to discrimination is far more important in the case
of blacks.22 This result is in line with the idea that racial prejudice a⁄ects
blacks more than it does browns. However, a portion of this discrimination is
potentially due to unequal opportunities in the capacity to ￿nance a private
education.
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11Table 2: Summary Statistics: Adult Males, by Ethnic Group
Unemployed Employed
Racial group White Brown Black White Brown Black
Number of obs. 4090 4319 747 32833 24442 3525
Age: mean 31:81 30:34 31:50 37:62 35:79 36:47
(std deviation) 13:16 12:47 12:69 11:62 11:81 11:89
Hourly earnings (in Reais) 1:233 0:599 0:591
Yrs of completed schooling 6:53 4:77 4:87 7:40 5:01 5:05
(std. deviation) 3:97 3:66 3:57 (4:39) (4:00) (3:91)
Region
of residence (%)
North (%) 3:88 10:02 2:81 3:68 11:92 3:71
Northeast 23:44 42:04 41:36 15:70 43:67 31:97
Central Brazil 0:085 10:07 8:43 10:54 14:05 7:60
South 27:40 5:25 8:56 29:45 5:54 10:57
Southeast 36:74 22:59 38:82 40:63 24:82 46:15
Self-evaluation
of health (%)
Bad health 2:76 3:33 3:32 1:73 2:49 2:21
Occupational sector (%)
Professional, Technical 9:64 4:59 4:91
Administration 19:79 10:47 8:57
Services 2:79 3:46 3:77
Trades 14:77 13:48 10:16
Transportation 9:39 8:27 8:11
Industry 29:06 34:91 44:14
Agriculture 14:56 24:81 20:34
Formal sector dummy 42:53 34:37 41:98
Source: Pesquisa National por Amostra de Domic￿lios, 1998.
12Table 3: Employment Equations, by Ethnic Group
Full


































































































Observations 69956 36923 28761 4272
Pseudo R-squared 0:11 0:11 0:10 0:08
LR ￿2 5334:21 2598:58 2233:75 301:64
Prob> ￿2 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00
Note: Probit Speci￿cation.
White heteroskedasticity-consistent absolute value of t-statistics below coe¢ cients.
Table 4: Predicted and Actual Occupational Distribution
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
pi
c White 0:096 0:197 0:027 0:295 0:147 0:093 0:145
Brown 0:045 0:104 0:034 0:353 0:134 0:082 0:248
Black 0:049 0:085 0:037 0:444 0:101 0:081 0:203
^ p￿i
c White 0:095 0:175 0:033 0:292 0:153 0:092 0:156
Brown 0:043 0:113 0:040 0:316 0:146 0:086 0:251
Black 0:042 0:115 0:043 0:346 0:143 0:097 0:211
p￿
c 0:073 0:153 0:031 0:322 0:139 0:088 0:190
(1) Professional and Technical, (2) Administration, (3) Services, (4) Industry,
(5) Trades, (6) Transportation, (7) Agriculture.
pi
c is the actual proportion of ethnic group i in the relevant sector.
p￿i
c is the predicted proportion of ethnic group i in the relevant sector if it
faced attributes Z
i
c and "non-discriminatory" coe¢ cients from the occupational
choice model estimated using a multinomial logit.
p￿
c is the proportion of each ethnic group in the absence of segregation.
13Table 5: Wage Equations*, by sector, for Whites
White group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Experience 0:063 0:068 0:045 0:061 0:068 0:056 0:060
[13:64] [19:15] [12:14] [28:54] [18:88] [13:04] [7:89]
(Experience)2 ￿0:001 ￿0:001 ￿0:001 ￿0:001 ￿0:001 ￿0:001 ￿0:001
[9:05] [11:42] [9:97] [21:55] [14:31] [9:71] [6:57]
Yrs of schooling 0:187 0:154 0:117 0:118 0:142 0:101 0:103
[33:39] [48:81] [23:40] [48:12] [40:46] [21:46] [10:85]
Formal sector ￿0:059 ￿0:126 0:206 0:172 0:018 ￿0:133 0:066
[2:04] [6:01] [9:70] [13:87] [0:75] [5:50] [1:46]
Bad health ￿0:067 ￿0:171 ￿0:243 ￿0:254 ￿0:287 ￿0:257 ￿0:333
[0:35] [1:39] [4:22] [4:56] [2:53] [2:88] [1:50]
Household head 0:570 0:648 0:608 0:609 0:595 0:527 0:553
[15:48] [22:52] [21:58] [38:10] [20:22] [16:71] [10:13]
Region
Northeast ￿0:206 ￿0:154 ￿0:296 ￿0:359 ￿0:345 ￿0:306 ￿0:540
[4:89] [4:65] [9:34] [16:57] [9:90] [8:39] [6:91]
Southeast 0:018 0:037 0:090 0:128 0:011 0:125 0:015
[0:55] [1:60] [3:45] [9:46] [0:43] [4:82] [0:28]
Central Brazil 0:102 0:137 0:170 ￿0:019 ￿0:005 ￿0:003 ￿0:081
[2:14] [3:95] [5:34] [0:76] [0:13] [0:05] [1:02]
Urban area 0:223 0:255 0:180 0:163 0:173 0:138 0:378
[2:81] [6:06] [7:95] [7:97] [3:20] [3:14] [6:02]
Constant ￿1:934 ￿1:841 ￿2:139 ￿1:859 ￿1:971 ￿1:298 ￿1:991
[18:62] [31:27] [34:27] [51:81] [27:05] [16:59] [16:20]
Observations 3164 6497 4784 9541 4848 3084 915
R-squared 0:51 0:45 0:32 0:47 0:43 0:33 0:37
White heteroskedasticity-consistent absolute value of t-statistics below coe¢ cients.
* Wage equation adjusted for the self-selection bias into employment.
(1) Professional and Technical, (2) Administration, (3)Services, (4) Industry, (5) Trades, (6)
Transportation, (7) Agriculture.
Source: Pesquisa National por Amostra de Domic￿lios, 1998.
14Table 6: Wage Equations*, by sector, for Browns
Brown group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Experience 0:056 0:077 0:055 0:072 0:065 0:062 0:075
[7:04] [15:27] [16:42] [30:43] [14:43] [12:00] [11:39]
(Experience)2 ￿0:001 ￿0:001 ￿0:001 ￿0:001 ￿0:001 ￿0:001 ￿0:001
[4:24] [9:24] [14:31] [23:08] [11:48] [8:89] [10:51]
Yrs of schooling 0:152 0:150 0:096 0:106 0:121 0:085 0:093
[21:99] [30:28] [20:49] [41:73] [26:47] [15:79] [11:94]
Formal sector 0:016 ￿0:138 0:298 0:191 0:026 0:083 0:190
[0:33] [4:16] [16:98] [14:71] [0:90] [2:73] [4:27]
Bad health ￿0:371 ￿0:436 ￿0:356 ￿0:447 ￿0:641 ￿0:317 ￿0:177
[1:35] [2:72] [8:03] [9:79] [7:60] [3:11] [1:16]
Household head 0:668 0:682 0:577 0:615 0:744 0:581 0:556
[11:30] [16:40] [26:60] [37:55] [20:75] [15:44] [11:53]
Region
Northeast ￿0:171 ￿0:255 ￿0:296 ￿0:265 ￿0:139 ￿0:261 ￿0:290
[2:75] [5:90] [10:71] [14:26] [3:58] [6:31] [4:27]
Southeast ￿0:011 0:013 ￿0:069 0:117 0:099 0:106 0:114
[0:16] [0:27] [2:36] [6:18] [2:34] [2:51] [1:56]
Central Brazil 0:247 0:086 0:169 0:077 0:239 0:143 0:088
[3:38] [1:65] [5:57] [3:35] [4:98] [2:57] [1:07]
Urban area 0:237 0:426 0:151 0:172 0:195 0:216 0:280
[2:31] [7:98] [8:01] [8:26] [3:45] [4:37] [4:62]
Constant ￿1:920 ￿2:353 ￿2:271 ￿2:151 ￿2:300 ￿1:744 ￿2:290
[15:00] [28:25] [41:62] [53:19] [27:39] [19:25] [19:34]
Observations 1121 2560 6065 8533 3296 2021 846
R-squared 0:54 0:49 0:34 0:50 0:40 0:37 0:45
White heteroskedasticity-consistent absolute value of t-statistics below coe¢ cients.
* Wage equation adjusted for the self-selection bias into employment.
(1) Professional and Technical, (2) Administration, (3)Services, (4) Industry, (5) Trades, (6)
Transportation, (7) Agriculture.
Source: Pesquisa National por Amostra de Domic￿lios, 1998.
15Table 7: Wage Equations*, by sector, for Blacks
Black group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Experience 0:064 0:061 0:033 0:061 0:053 0:075 0:054
[3:08] [5:35] [3:98] [10:69] [4:17] [6:72] [2:68]
(Experience)2 ￿0:001 ￿0:000 ￿0:000 ￿0:001 ￿0:001 ￿0:001 ￿0:001
[2:27] [3:17] [3:27] [7:31] [4:38] [5:08] [2:90]
Yrs of schooling 0:172 0:139 0:074 0:105 0:110 0:109 0:024
[8:79] [12:37] [6:10] [18:35] [8:22] [6:44] [0:99]
Formal sector 0:028 0:038 0:239 0:156 ￿0:023 0:210 0:146
[0:19] [0:46] [4:94] [5:20] [0:29] [2:48] [1:10]
Bad health ￿0:209 ￿0:158 ￿0:579 ￿0:462 ￿0:660 ￿0:183 ￿0:623
[0:89] [0;49] [4:85] [3:07] [1:62] [1:13] [2:17]
Household head 0:656 0:661 0:530 0:579 0:745 0:434 0:674
[4:94] [7:27] [9:63] [16:05] [7:73] [4:58] [4:27]
Region
Northeast ￿0:663 ￿0:493 ￿0:241 ￿0:361 ￿0:594 ￿0:406 ￿0:238
[3:98] [4:09] [3:07] [7:63] [4:70] [3:15] [1:11]
Southeast ￿0:300 ￿0:231 0:038 0:023 ￿0:107 ￿0:049 0:026
[1:74] [2:29] [0:52] [0:57] [0:86] [0:39] [0:13]
Central Brazil ￿0:426 ￿0:167 0:107 ￿0:131 ￿0:308 ￿0:095 ￿0:090
[1:59] [1:17] [1:00] [1:79] [1:61] [0:53] [0:38]
Urban area ￿0:126 0:422 0:210 0:224 0:213 0:200 0:329
[0:38] [2:29] [4:54] [4:03] [1:76] [2:18] [2:02]
Constant ￿1:663 ￿2:105 ￿1:946 ￿2:020 ￿1:716 ￿1:991 ￿1:759
[3:72] [8:68] [14:75] [22:27] [7:38] [8:55] [4:45]
Observations 173 302 717 1556 358 286 133
R-squared 0:57 0:55 0:35 0:48 0:49 0:39 0:31
White heteroskedasticity-consistent absolute value of t-statistics below coe¢ cients.
* Wage equation adjusted for the self-selection bias into employment.
(1) Professional and Technical, (2) Administration, (3)Services, (4) Industry, (5) Trades, (6)
Transportation, (7) Agriculture.
Source: Pesquisa National por Amostra de Domic￿lios, 1998
16Figure 1: Cumulative densities of log hourly wage, by ethnic group
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